The Iranian Nuclear Program: What the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] and its Criticizers Forgot

Washington, DC (Homeland Security Research Corporation) December 10,2007 - The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) made public on December 3rd 2007 was greeted by a torrent of critical reviews by many in the intelligence community, the media and politicians on both sides of the aisle. The NIE and its criticizers neglected to discuss a critical alternative program the Iranians may be working on. Once Iran acquires 20 to 30 Kg of Weapon Grade Uranium (WgU), approximately the size of an orange, a mere machine shop will be required to create a Hiroshima-like Atomic bomb. This, in turn, will provide the Iranian regime with several world-changing strategic options.

Some of the multitude of learned articles published in the wake of this NIE attacked the conclusions of the NIE with respect to Iran's nuclear weapons program from several angles.

There were those who argued that it is not reasonable that the Iranian program for producing WgU at the Natanz site (currently supervised 24/7 by the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) CCTV systems linked to the Vienna IAEA HQ) is a ruze, attracting attention away from covert sites where the Iranians operate a secret WgU production program. There were those (such as the University of Maryland’s, Avner Cohen, expert on nuclear weapons programs), who said that the NIE estimate was shoddily prepared and so were the analysis and the conclusions that were derived from it.

Other Iran experts claimed that Iran proved repeatedly over the years that it is sophisticated and scheming enough to spread misinformation and to cover the true purpose of its activities.

In this article, we would like to highlight an aspect of this discussion that was not presented by the NIE or by its critiques. For the purpose of clarifying that aspect, we assume prima facia that the raw intelligence used to construct the NIE was correct. This intelligence, as presented by the intelligence community in several well leaked instances, included intercepted conversations of complaints by several heads of the Iranian military regarding the fact that by the end of 2003 the R&D project aimed at developing a nuclear warhead for deployment on Iranian Shihab Missiles was effectively halted.

This intelligence, allegedly intercepted by the Americans, relates to the development of “Implosion” type nuclear devices (similar to the device that was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki during World War II). Indeed, developing such a device requires years of meticulous R&D, high technological capability, and a set of nuclear tests.

Also, for the purpose of this discussion, we assume that this program was indeed halted completely, and as a result it is reasonable to assume that in the next few years the Iranians will not posses such nuclear weapons.

But, both the NIE and those who argue with its findings ignored a potential substitute to the “Implosion” warhead that may be actually available to the Iranians. This substitute includes a nuclear weapon program for the production of a “Gun Type” bomb. To produce a “Gun Type” bomb, there is a need for about 25 Kg (50 lbs) of WgU which is then installed within the barrel of a cannon, along with High Explosives (HE). Such a crude and bulky device (similar to the device which was dropped on Hiroshima) can be developed in a machine shop no larger than a small factory, by several mechanical and nuclear engineers. Moreover, the gun type bomb’s components could be manufactured while the enriched Uranium (HEU) is prepared, so that within several weeks of producing 50 lbs of HEU, a device could be ready for detonation.

As analyzed 65 years ago by the “Manhattan” program scientists, a “gun type” WgU bomb needs no pre-use testing, its function is guaranteed, the only uncertainty is its detonation yield [measured in Kilotons of TNT] .From a strategic perspective, it is not critically important if the yield will be in the order of 2-4 kiloton, or 15-30 kiloton. The mere existence of an Iranian nuclear arsenal will be a world-changing event!

A close scrutiny of the NIE, specifically its last paragraph shows that the authors “judge with moderate confidence” that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009,” the authors proceed to add an unclear statement to the effect that “but that this is very unlikely.”

What is not mentioned in the NIE’s published report, and in its critique, is that it is quite possible that Iran has already purchased a significant quantity of WgU from the disintegrating Soviet stocks in the early 1990’s. At least one such Iranian attempt to procure ex Soviet WgU was detected and frustrated by the CIA.

If, as the NIE says, Iran may be in a position to complete one or more “Gun Type” device(s) by the end of 2009, the Iranians will be able to enact one of several scenarios:

Scenario 1 Iran can adopt the so-called Israeli policy of “Nuclear Opacity”. That is, it can leak some hints that it already possesses a nuclear arsenal, but never officially confirm it. Under the protective umbrella of the “Nuclear Opacity” it can resume its missile-borne nuclear warheads development.

Scenario 2 Iran can detonate the device in an underground test – In such an event, Iran will prove that it has the capability to detonate a nuclear device (similar to the demonstration carried out by the North Koreans). Since Western intelligence agencies are not likely to know how many devices the Iranians have left, this will effectively put a halt on any thought of using offensive capabilities against Iranian nuclear installations, by either the U.S. or Israel.

Iran will therefore find itself in a unique position of power, which will provide the Islamic Republic with much desired political and economic maneuvering space. Iran will effectively buy the time it needs to complete its more complex nuclear-tipped missile program.

Scenario 3 Nuclear terror – A risk-taking Iranian leadership might hand over a nuclear device to a terror organization, which in turn will be able to transport the device to Europe, Israel or the U.S. and set it for detonation (With the present setbacks of the American driven global anti nuclear trafficking program, the Iranians have at least a 5 years window of opportunity to carry out such a strategy). The detonation of a nuclear device in any Western country will result in a catastrophic political-economic crisis; stock markets will collapse, the transportation of goods and industry will come to standstill, and economies will crumble quickly.

Such an attack can be followed by a two pronged nuclear blackmail strategy. The terrorists can claim to possess additional bombs already located at other major U.S. metropolitan centers. They can then threaten to detonate these bombs unless the U.S. withdraws from the Middle East and Afghanistan. To secure such a strategy, the terrorists can warn the Federal government that any attempt to search the bombs or evacuate the population will be addressed by an immediate detonation of those bombs.

Since the West will have no retaliatory address to such an attack, it is reasonable to assume that neither the U.S. nor Israel will be willing to initiate nuclear counter strikes. The extended neglect by the West to establish a viable program for the detection and neutralization of nuclear weapon threats will return to haunt constituencies and politicians alike. The most optimistic assumptions do not envision a viable counter-nuclear threat network before 2012 at the earliest.

The inevitable conclusion is straight forward. The free world must tighten the economic sanctions against Iran in the hope that the sanctions will both drive a regime change and require the present regime to commit to a completely transparent nuclear program.

The catastrophic world-changing ramifications of a potential nuclear Iran do not leave much room for probabilistic assessments. Most of us invest in life insurance to guarantee our family future, however slim the chance of our dying the next years may be. Shouldn’t the free world invest in a similar life insurance?